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Abstract—Encryption is commonly used to provide confi-
dentiality of sensitive or personal information when held on
smartphones. While many Android devices feature inbuilt full-
disk encryption as a precaution against theft of a device, this is
not available on all devices, and doesn’t provide security against
a device which is turned on and in use. For this reason, a
wide variety of applications are available within the Google Play
Store, offering to encrypt user data. Modern, strong encryption
offers strong assurances of confidentiality when used correctly,
although the fundamental cryptographic primitives are complex,
with many opportunities for mistakes to be made.
The security of a number of implementations of Android-
based encryption applications is investigated. Highly popular
applications, including those by Google-endorsed “Top Devel-
opers”, are considered. A number of major weaknesses in the
implementation of encryption within these applications is pre-
sented. This highlights the importance of both well-audited open-
source cryptographic implementations, as well as the underlying
cryptographic algorithms themselves, given the vulnerabilities
identified in these applications. In many cases, there was no
encryption in use by the application, and file headers were
undergoing trivial static obfuscation, such that files would appear
corrupted. In other cases, encryption algorithms were used, but
with significant implementational errors. In these cases, plaintext
recovery was still possible, due to the use of static keys for every
installation of the app, and the re-use of cipher initialisation
vectors.
I. INTRODUCTION
Encryption is a term many internet and mobile users are
familiar with today; it is commonly accepted good practice
to encrypt confidential data, and indeed many organisations’
information security policies mandate the use of encryption
for data security and confidentiality purposes [1]. This paper
explores popular real-world implementations of encryption
within a range of Android applications, and demonstrates that
the mere presence of encryption is insufficient to ensure the
security and confidentiality of user data.
Within the conventional model of security being defined as
confidentiality, integrity and availability, encryption is used to
provide confidentiality. It can also be used in certain modes of
operation to provide integrity, where an cipher incorporating
ciphertext authentication is used. Within the context of this
work, however, applications will only be evaluated from the
perspective of the confidetiality they offer for data. This is
for because none of the applications investigated attempted to
carry out ciphertext authentication.
This work was carried out through black-box analysis of
a selection of Android applications, available on the Play
Store, investigating the efficacy of various applications through
analysis of the ciphertext outputs. All tests were initially
carried out on a Moto G 2014 Android handset, with the
Android Debug Bridge (ADB) interface used to gain access
to the device’s shared storage. It should be noted that third
party applications can access any files stored here, through the
widely-used READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE permission, and
could therefore exploit these weaknesses. Findings were then
reproduced on a Nexus 5X handset, in order to verify that they
applied across different devices. Wherever possible, all work
was carried out with devices disconnected from the internet,
to ensure that no external factors or automatic updates would
affect the methodology used. The latest available version of
each application was used when the work was carried out, and
was downloaded from the Google Play Store. Unless otherwise
stated, no modifications or root access was required on the
device in order to carry out the procedures used.
Schneier’s law dates back to 1998 [2], with his statement on
the matter that anyone may design a security they themselves
cannot break. This itself has roots in the work of Babbage
in 1864 [3], where he stated “One of the most singular
characteristics of the art of deciphering is the strong conviction
possessed by every person, even moderately acquainted with
it, that he is able to construct a cipher which nobody else
can decipher.” Despite this, much of today’s widely-available
cryptographic software continues to be built according to
this premise, whereby it remains breakable. By considering
widely-used encryption software on the Android platform,
it will be demonstrated that users remain at risk due to
fundamental misunderstandings of the use of encryption, or
even what may be classed as encryption.
II. PREVIOUS WORKS
While a wide range of security and encryption applications
are available on the Android platform, there appears to be little
previous works considering their practical security. Previous
work considering the usability of security systems has consid-
ered PGP [4], and highlighted the risks to security posed by
complex or otherwise confusing systems. In contrast, all of the
encryption apps considered within this work were relatively
user friendly. The security of networked Android applications
has been widely considered, with various work exploring TLS
implementations and validation of server certificates [5], [6],
[7].
Egle et al. carried out a study of misuse of cryptographic
constructs within Android applications in 2013 [8], which
highlighted that 88% of applications they reviewed made
errors in their use of cryptography APIs in Android. As part
of this work, a number of rules were proposed, surrounding
correct uses of cryptography within applications, including
avoiding use of ECB mode, avoiding use of non-random IVs
for CBC encryption, etc.
III. APPLICATIONS INVESTIGATED
The applications listed in Table I were investigated. Note
that “(TD)” denotes an application by a Google Play Top
Developer.
Each application was installed on a test device, as detailed
in Section I. For applications claiming to encrypt images, three
JPG images were used for the test. The same set images were
used for each application. For applications claiming to encrypt
videos, a set of three MP4 videos were used. Methdology for
the password manager considered is discussed in the relevant
section.
IV. HIDE PHOTO & VIDEO VAULT (VLOCKER)
The Vlocker application used package name
com.simpleapp.vlocker [9], and version 1.0.1
was investigated, which was the latest version available,
released on 20th January 2016. At the time of writing, it had
between half a million and one million downloads from the
Play Store, and 4574 reviews with an average score of 4.2/5
stars.
A. Developer Claims
The developer of the software claimed to use encryption
within the application — “Vlocker is the Super Video Hider.
Lightning encryption and password recovery feature allow
your privacy more secure”. More specifically, the develop-
ers claimed “Encryption - your videos are encrypted using
advanced 128 bit AES encryption”, although somewhat in-
triguingly also claim they allow for email-based recovery of a
user’s PIN within the application [9].
B. Operation of Application
The application was used to encrypt a short MPEG-4
video, recorded using the test handset. The original video was
downloaded to the computer, prior to the encryption of the
video. The application was then used to encrypt the video.
The file was no longer available at the path it was previously
available. A hidden directory .vlocker was noted to have
been added to the /sdcard shared storage area of the device.
Fig. 1. Comparison of original file and vlocker-protected file
Within this folder was the layout of the vault shown by the
application. A new file was found, with the same name as
previously, with the suffix .vlocker appended to it. This
file was retrieved to the computer using ADB.
An initial inspection of the so-called encrypted file indicated
that it had not been encrypted with AES-128, as claimed by
the developers. Indeed, after the first 8192 bytes of the file,
the remainder was byte-for-byte identical with the original file,
indicating that only the MPEG4 header had been tampered.
Figure 1 shows a comparison of the original file with the
file after processing by vlocker. Cursory inspection highlights
that this header has not been encrypted by AES, as the output
distribution is nonuniform. Indeed, where a byte of 0x00
would be expected in the original video, a byte of 0xFF was
seen in the vlocker-protected file.
Therefore, Equation 1a was formed, to determine the output
of the encryption process. It can be reversed by re-arranging
for decryption, as seen in Equation 1b.
ciphertext[i] = 255− plaintext[i] (1a)
plaintext[i] = 255− ciphertext[i] (1b)
Carrying out this process across the first 8192 bytes of the
header revealed the original file, and this was confirmed by
both per-byte comparison of the file, as well as the original
and decoded files having the same cryptographic hash.
C. Security Conclusions
Therefore, it can be concluded that, contrary to the claims
of the developers, vlocker did not make use of AES-128
encryption. Indeed, it made no use of encryption at all —
the protection applied to files is merely that from hiding them
in a folder whose name begins with a “.” character, which
typically hides them from view, and by inverting the bytes of
the MPEG-4 header.
V. HIDE PICTURES & VIDEOS - FOTOX
FotoX, available on the Play Store using package name
com.smsrobot.photox, claimed that “all your private
data will be secured, encrypted and invisible to other Gallery
apps” [10]. The developers, SMSROBOT Ltd, are listed as
being “Top Developers” on the Google Play Store, and FotoX
App Name Package Name Current User Count Version Investigated
Hide Photo & Video Vault com.simpleapp.vlocker [9] 0.5 to 1 million 1.0.1
Hide Pictures & Videos - FotoX com.smsrobot.photox [10] 1 to 5 million (TD) 1.9
Vault - Hide Photos/App Lock com.smsrobot.vault [11] 0.5 to 1 million (TD) 1.9
Photo Locker com.handyapps.photoLocker [12] 10 to 50 million (TD) 1.2.1
Video Locker com.handyapps.videolocker [13] 5 to 10 million (TD) 1.2.1
Password Locker - Data Vault com.handyapps.passwordlocker [14] 0.1 to 0.5 million (TD) 1.0.2
Video Locker net.newsoftwares.videolockeradvanced [15] 10,000 to 50,000 1.0.3
Gallery Vault com.thinkyeah.galleryvault [16] 10 to 50 million 2.6.5
Encrypt File Free com.acr.encryptfilefree [17] 50,000 to 100,000 1.0.8
TABLE I
DETAILS OF APPLICATIONS INVESTIGATED.
Fig. 2. Comparison of original file (upper) against FotoX-protected file
(lower)
has between one and five million installs, with 21,131 reviews
giving an average of 4.3/5 stars. Version 1.9 of the application
was investigated, released in October 2015, the most recent
available at the time of investigation.
A. Operation of Application
FotoX was used to protect a JPG image which was stored on
the Android device’s shared storage. Following the use of the
encryption process, the file was no longer visible within the
original directory. Like with vlocker, a hidden folder whose
name began with dot was used to hide the folder from FotoX.
Within the directory .FotoX was the filesystem layout of
the so-called vault, and these folders contained the protected
files. The encrypted file had the suffix .quickcrypt ap-
pended to its name. It was extracted using ADB, and compared
to the original file. This comparison indicated that only the
very first few bytes of the file differed. Figure 2 shows a
comparison of this region of the header of the file.
Specifically, FotoX had only swapped a pair of bytes — the
first two bytes of the file, containing the JPEG magic bytes
of FF D8 had been swapped with the 11th and 12th bytes,
which were 00 00. This was the only difference between the
two files, and reversal was trivial, by swapping the bytes back
to their original locations, to obtain the original file. The file
was again confirmed identical with the original by comparison
of the file’s cryptographic hash.
B. Security Conclusions
It was clear that FotoX does not employ encryption in
its handling of images, as was claimed in its description.
The swapping of 2 bytes in the header with another 2 bytes
was sufficient to ensure the image would not open in image
viewers, but this does not offer any level of security as one
would expect from software claiming to implement encryption.
C. Similar Applications
Another application from the same developer was also in-
vestigated — “Vault - Hide Photos/App Lock”, using package
name com.smsrobot.vault, had 500,000 to one million
downloads on the Play Store, and an average of 4.1/5 stars
from 7249 reviews.
Like with FotoX, Vault claims that “Once in the Vault, all
your private data will be secured, encrypted and invisible to
other Gallery apps”. Investigation revealed that Vault used the
same process as described in this section to protect images,
swapping bytes from the header. There was no encryption,
despite this being claimed within the description of the appli-
cation.
VI. HANDYAPPS (VARIOUS APPLICATIONS)
Video Locker is an application by the Google Play Store
“Top Developer” Handy Apps. It had an average rating of
4.3/5 stars from 144,343 reviews, and had between 5 and
10 million installs. Version 1.2.1 was investigated, the latest
available at the time, as of January 2016. Photo Locker is a
similar application by the same developers, with an average
rating of 4.2/5 stars, after 151,636 reviews. Photo Locker has
between 10 and 50 million installs. Version 1.2.1 was again
investigated.
A. Developer Claims
The developers of Video Locker claimed it is “the ultimate
secret gallery app”, and that a key feature is its encryption:
Encryption - hidden videos are not only moved to a
secret location on your phone but are also encrypted
using advanced 128 bit AES encryption. This means
that even if someone manage to steal your SD card
and copy the hidden video files, they will still be
unable to view the locked videos [13]
Identically worded claims were made for Photo Locker [12],
including the assertion of 128-bit AES encryption. Since the
operation of the two applications were found to be near
identical, the operation of the two shall be considered together
— only minor differences exist between the applications,
specifically around the types of file accepted by each applica-
tion.
B. Operation of Application
Upon encrypting a video with Video Locker, it was removed
from its original location. A new folder within the shared stor-
age, named .VL was identified, containing the vault contents.
Fig. 3. Comparison of original file (upper) against Video Locker-protected
file (lower)
Fig. 4. Comparison of two different Video Locker-protected files
Each file had .vl appended to its name. Photo Locker created
a similar directory named .PL.
For videos, only the first 8192 bytes differed from the
original file, indicating that only the file header had been
encrypted. Likwise for images, only the first 2048 bytes had
been modified. It was noticed that the header contents appeared
to be more uniformly distributed than the previous applications
investigated. This indicated that a regular encryption algorithm
may have been used.
Figure 3 shows a comparison of the first 144 bytes of an
original video file, against the protected file, indicating the
apparently-encrypted data.
To verify if encryption was being properly applied, the
Video Locker application had its data fully erased from the
device, including the vault. This meant that the application had
lost any of its state data. Therefore, it believed it was a new
install, and a new setup process was completed, with a new
PIN used within the app. Another (different) video was then
encrypted by Video Locker, and the encrypted video extracted.
The header of the two encrypted files were now compared
— if these two ciphertexts held similarities, there would
therefore be a correlation between the ciphertexts, indicating
that similar plaintexts revealed similar ciphertexts. As shown
in Figure 4, the two headers were similar for the vast majority
of bytes, indicating that this was likely use of a statically
initialised cipher. Indeed, the offsets of the bytes differing in
the ciphertext were the same offsets as the bytes differing in
the plaintexts. For example, at offset 0x1a of Figure 4, two
bytes differ between the ciphertexts.
Figure 5 shows that these same bytes in the plaintext
Fig. 5. Comparison of the original video files
differed. For ease of comparison, those bytes are highlighted
with arrows.
Therefore, it was clear that, given the correlation between
the two ciphertexts, the same key and initialisation parameters
were being used, even though a different PIN was being
used in the application for the encryption of the second
file. This was confirmed by using the XOR function across
differing bytes of both plaintext and ciphertext. For example,
from Figure 3, bytes 0x31 - 0x33 were [03, 20, 8A] in
VID 3, and [00, E7, D9] in VID 4. Within the corresponding
ciphertexts in Figure 4, these bytes were [10, BD, 03] and
[13, 7A, 50] respectively.
By carrying out the XOR function across the plaintexts,
the result was [00 ⊕ 03, 20 ⊕ E7, 8A ⊕ D9] = [03, C7, 53].
Across the ciphertexts, the result of XOR was [10⊕13, BD⊕
7A, 03 ⊕ 50] = [03, C7, 53], showing that the XOR of the
two ciphertexts revealed the XOR of the two plaintexts,
thus proving the same key and cipher parameters are used
on different files, thus leaking information between different
ciphertexts.
Since the same key was used for all data encrypted by the
app, and this was static between different installations of the
app, this makes the ciphertext vulnerable to a simple known-
plaintext attack. By encrypting a large file, and recording
both the plaintext and ciphertext of that file, any arbitrary file
may be decrypted with the XOR function, since an unknown
ciphertext was able to be XOR’d with the ciphertext whose
corresponding plaintext is known, and the result XOR’d with
the known plaintext to reveal the unknown plaintext.
C. Decryption of Video Locker & Photo Locker Data
While the above information indicated that that files could
be decrypted by an attacker, the process used to protect
user files remained somewhat unclear and convoluted. It was
identified firstly that using a different PIN and recovery
email address for the application did not affect the encryption
procedure — the same ciphertext was generated in each case.
This also confirmed the static nature of the IV and key, and
confirmed the above findings carried across different PINs and
recovery email addresses.
A file named .config was located within the root di-
rectory of both apps’ vaults. This file contained two base64-
encoded strings, which themselves decoded to scrambled data.
By analysing the operation of the application, it emerged that
this information was held to allow a user to transfer their data
to a new Android device. This file contained a protected copy
of the user’s PIN and recovery email address. Neither was
padded, allowing for trivial identification of the length of each
— following decoding from base64, the number of bytes was
the same as the length of each string.
Since the recovery process could be initiated on a new
device, it was clear this data must be able to be accessed by
the application itself, and it was clear the user PIN was not
hashed, given its length. It was determined that a static key was
used to decrypt this data, using AES-128 in CTR mode, with a
static (fixed) IV. Analysis of the strings within the application
binary revealed that the key and IV were constant, static values
which were stored within the application.
D. Password Locker
Password Locker is an application by Handy Apps, the same
developer as Video Locker and Photo Locker. It has between
100,000 and 500,000 users, and an average rating of 3.9/5
from 1,179 reviews. Password Locker, as the name suggests,
is designed for the secure storage of passwords by users, and
makes a large number of security claims.
For example, the developers stated that Password Locker
“stores your sensitive information offline and passwords safe,
secure and organised”, and that it has “many optional con-
venient features for it to be the best password manager
ever designed specifically for Android” [14]. Specific details
were also given as to the encryption supposedly used — the
developers stated:
Secure
Lock up your data in Password Locker with ex-
tremely tough and strong 256-bit AES encryption
- military level encryption (takes trillions of years
to decrypt) [14]
Password Locker stores its password database within the ap-
plication’s private storage, meaning that root access is required
to retrieve the database. Note, however, that it also offers a paid
feature to enable cloud synchronisation of passwords with a
user’s Dropbox or Google Drive account, which may expose
this database to third party services. Nonetheless, given the
ease with which Android devices may be rooted with exploits
such as CVE-2014-3153 (TowelRoot) and CVE-2015-3636
(Ping Sockets root), we consider it viable that a malicious
party may easily gain access to the database. Nonetheless, if
the claims made by the developers are accurate, users would
have nothing to fear, as their data would be appropriately
encrypted.
The database was found to hold base64-encoded fields, in
the structure of the records, as shown in Figure 6. From this, it
was immediately possible to identify the use of weak, poten-
tially broken cryptography, by the observation of a common
prefix between the two ciphertexts for bank_label and
acc_name. Since this was simply the default record created
by the application, it was possible to verify the hypothesis
that they shared a prefix of 3 characters (given the 4 base64-
encoded characters in common). Indeed, this suspicion was
found correct — the bank account label was “Sam Sample”
and the account name was “Sample Checking Acct”. Once
again, there was no padding present in the ciphertexts, and
Fig. 6. Password Locker Database Structure
lengths of plaintexts could be identified directly from cipher-
text lengths, due to a lack of padding.
The presence of prefixes also indicated that the cipher
in use was not being initialised with unique parameters for
each operation. Therefore, to demonstrate the ability for key
recovery, the following process was carried out, where kc is
a known ciphertext, kp is the corresponding known plaintext,
and uc is an unknown ciphertext, with the length of uc < kc:
key = kc⊕ kp (2a)
up = key ⊕ uc (2b)
By XOR’ing a known plaintext and ciphertext together per
Equation 2a, the AES block key is obtained. By then XOR’ing
this block key against an unknown ciphertext, for the length
of the unknown ciphertext, discarding any remaining block
key material, the unknown plaintext up was recovered, per
Equation 2b.
This was confirmed across 2 Android devices, with different
PINs and security parameters set on each, to prove that the
key used is static, and not derived from the user’s password.
Therefore, the data is merely obfuscated. Anyone carrying
out the above may decrypt any other user’s Password Locker
database trivially, using Equation 2b, since key is constant
across all installations. This is of particular concern if users
were to use the export functionality to store their passwords
within cloud services, as any third party may determine their
passwords using this technique.
E. Security Conclusions
This highlighted that while Video Locker does indeed use
the AES cipher, it only encrypted the header of the MPEG-4
file, rather than its contents. It used static parameters for this
encryption, for all files, irrespective of PIN used, leaking infor-
mation between files. These static parameters were hard-coded
into the application and therefore offer no security to users.
Indeed, the use of CTR encryption with fixed initialisation vec-
tor also leaked other information, although the use of a static
encryption key and IV meant that anyone with access to this
widely-used software, or knowledge of how it operates, may
decrypt files by any other user. More concerningly, Password
Locker, another app from Handy Apps, uses similarly broken
encryption to protect users passwords, while offering cloud
backup facilities. The key for Password Locker is static across
all devices, meaning that anyone may trivially decrypt anyone
else’s passwords and secret information. We demonstrate that
this attack was possible, and note it did not take “trillions of
years” to decrypt, as the developers asserted [14]. This is of
particular concern for an application claiming to protect user
passwords, especially given the off-device backup facility.
Fig. 7. Comparison of original file against Video Locker-protected file
VII. VIDEO LOCKER (NEWSOFTWARES.NET)
Video Locker Advanced is an application by the developer
NewSoftwares.net. To avoid ambiguity with the other appli-
cation named Video Locker, investigated previously, we shall
refer to this application as Video Locker Advanced, in-keeping
with its package name. It had an average rating of 4.2/5
stars from 192 reviews, and had between 10,000 and 50,000
installs. Version 1.0.3 of the application was investigated,
which was released in January 2016, and the latest available.
The developers claimed to use “Encryption - The app locks
your personal videos, prevents video hack.”, and that it protects
private videos “using fast encryption techniques” [15].
A. Operation of Application
Video Locker Advanced was used to encrypt a video
captured from the camera on the test phone. The video was
retrieved from the device prior to its encryption to provide a
comparison.
After encryption, and in-keeping with the other apps inves-
tigated so far, the file was no longer visible in its original
location. A new directory (which was not hidden) was located
within the root folder of the device share storage, titled
Video Locker Advanced Encrypted Data. Within
this directory was a vault structure, and the encrypted file was
located, with the original file extension separator dot replaced
with the # symbol. Therefore a file named VID_1.mp4
became VID_1#mp4.
Comparison of the original file with the protected file
indicated that only the header of the video had been modified,
with the first 100 bytes of the header flipped. Therefore, the
fourth byte became the 96th byte, as shown in Figure 7 —
the fourth byte 0x18 is seen at address 0x61. The ASCII
representation makes this reversal of the bytes clearer, as
shown in the right column of Figure 7.
B. Security Conclusions
From the above, it was clear that Video Locker Advanced
did not use the advanced encryption techniques which it
claimed — this amounted to reversing the bytes of the file
header. Concerningly, the application features Dropbox backup
support [15], which may lead users to believe that they
are uploading only encrypted data to Dropbox, when they
are in fact uploading plaintext user files with merely minor
obfuscation of the file headers.
Fig. 8. Schema of the GalleryVault database file table
VIII. GALLERY VAULT
Gallery Vault is an application by ThinkYeah Mobile, with
between 10 and 50 million reported users on the Play Store.
It has an average rating of 4.4/5, based on 223,160 reviews.
Version 2.6.5 was investigated, which was the latest version
available as of January 2016.
The developers state that “The hidden file are all encrypted”,
and that “GalleryVault is a fantastic privacy protection app to
easily hide and encrypt your photos, videos and any other files
that you do not want others to see” [16].
A. Operation of Application
Like the other applications investigated, Gallery Vault cre-
ated its own vault area on the shared storage, under the di-
rectory name .galleryvault_DoNotDelete_X, where
X was the Unix epoch time in seconds of the creation of the
vault.
Encrypted files were stored within a directory named
file, and named after the epoch time of their encryp-
tion. While this appeared initially to hide the filenames, a
folder named backup was located adjacent to the vault,
containing a backup of the application’s internal database,
galleryvault.db. Note that this database was contained
within the device shared storage, and is therefore accessible
to any software on the phone, and to anyone with access to
the device.
This database contained a tablet named file, which stored
an unencrypted mapping between protected and unprotected
files. The field org_name and org_path contained the
original name and path of the file respectively, with the path
also including the original filename. The database schema is
shown in Figure 8.
A JPEG photograph was encrypted using GalleryVault.
After extracting the encrypted file from the vault, it was
compared to the original file. Figure 9 shows the results this
comparison — only the first ten bytes of the file were found
to differ, and had simply been set to have byte values of zero.
While recovering from this would be straightforward, only
requiring identification of the correct header values, based
upon the image dimensions, it was found that this was not
Fig. 9. Comparison of original file (upper) against GalleryVault-protected file
(lower)
Fig. 10. GalleryVault database leaking original file header
necessary, on account of the leakage of the original header
information within the GalleryVault database file.
Within the file table, the field org_file_header_blob
contained the plaintext original file header, as shown in
Figure 10. Therefore, with access to only the GalleryVault-
protected file, and the backup database held in an adjacent
directory, within the globally accessible shared storage, it was
possible to immediately recover the file header, which can be
compared against Figure 9 to be identical to the original file’s
header which was removed.
B. Security Conclusions
From the above, it is clear that GalleryVault did not carry
out encryption of user image files. The first ten bytes of the
file header were zeroed out, although the header was backed
up, in plaintext, within an SQLite3 database that was held
adjacent to the protected file. Therefore, anyone with access
to the device can trivially restore these ten bytes, and have
restored the original file.
IX. ENCRYPT FILE FREE
Encrypt File Free, by MobilDev, was the second application
listed in the Play Store search for the query “encrypt”. It had
50,000 to 100,000 installs, and an average rating of 3.5/5
from 278 reviews. Version 1.0.8 of the application, from
November 2014, was the latest version available, and the
version investigated.
A. Developer Claims
The developer of Encrypt File Free states “Encrypt File
Free can encrypt and protect photos, videos, audios, pictures,
doc, ppt, xls, pdf and other files using a password”, and
that “The encrypted file can only be opened with the correct
password” [17]. They also state users should “Encrypt your
files and not just hide them. This solution is better and safer
than simply hiding files”.
B. Operation of Application
Since this tool was designed to encrypt files of any type,
rather than specifically videos or images, a test file was
created, as a first test of the algorithm. The test file consisted of
the sequence of 16 increasing bytes, 00, 11, 22... FF,
followed by 16 bytes set to FF, 48 zero bytes, and a further
32 bytes set to FF. The intention of using this test file was to
ascertain if the output of the cipher was strong and uniform,
Fig. 11. Plaintext selected for testing of Encrypt File Free
Fig. 12. Ciphertext output from Encrypt File Free for above test file
or weak and potentially breakable. The plaintext data is shown
in Figure 11.
Upon encrypting this file, which contained a total of 112
bytes, a ciphertext of 1168 bytes was returned. Examination of
this file highlighted that this file could likely be split into three
chunks — an ASCII representation of a 16 bytes hex string,
perhaps a hash like MD5, some unknown data, and finally
data which appeared to be the encrypted content of the file.
Figure 12 shows the resulting ciphertext output from Encrypt
File Free, with some of the 1024-byte header truncated for
readability.
The first 32 bytes were found to contain an ASCII repre-
sentation of the plain, unsalted, MD5 hash of the user’s PIN
for the application. For the example shown in Figure 12, the
PIN used was “111111” (as ASCII characters), and the MD5
hash shown in the first 32 bytes is an ASCII representation
of md5(111111). Therefore, the PIN was trivially exposed to
anyone with access to a ciphertext produced by the application,
on account of the ease of brute-forcing MD5 hashes. This
may be a risk where users unintentionally expose their device
or other PINs, as a result of the re-use of that PIN within
this application. Also of interest was that if the original data
and hash lengths (112 + 32) were subtracted from the overall
ciphertext length (1168), this indicated the middle section
of the data occupied exactly 1024 bytes, perhaps suggesting
padding or some form of fixed-length lookup table.
Indeed, by altering the PIN hash located at the header of
the file, the same file could be decrypted by another device,
which had never been in contact with the plaintext file, thus
showing that the file was not being encrypted with the user
PIN, and that its presence was merely for checking validity
of the entered PIN. Therefore, the process was no better than
storing the file in plaintext. In contrast to the other applications
investigated however, Encrypt File Free did actually modify
the body of the file, rather than merely the headers, although
it does not offer any effective security.
C. Cryptanalysis of the Output
The output of the cipher was found to be very weak, and
appeared to represent that of a monoalphabetic substitution
cipher. Specifically, the pattern of blocks of data was visible
in the output, with 16 differing values, then 16 values (say A),
then 48 different values (say B), then a further 32 bytes of A.
This pattern indicated that the structure of the input plaintext
was remaining constant through to the ciphertext. This can
be seen at the lower part of Figure 12, where the pattern of
repeated bytes has been exposed from the plaintext through to
the ciphertext.
By focusing on the 1024-byte block of unknown header
data, it was observed that different byte values appeared
with slightly different frequencies. An entropy estimation by
the Unix ent utility indicated that the header entropy was
approximately 7.47 bits per byte, although with the arithmetic
mean of data bytes significantly lower than expected, at around
80. Were the data uniformly distibuted, this would be expected
to be nearer 127.5. The auto-correlation coefficient across the
header was also somewhat elevated, at around 0.3, rather than
0, which would be expected for random and unpredictable
data.
An inconsistency within the distribution of the data within
the 1024-byte header was also noticed, since each byte value
from 0x00 to 0xFF was found to exist exactly once within
the first 256 bytes. This therefore appeared to be a form of
one-to-one look-up table, given the lack of duplicates, and
presence of each value.
By using a crib from a known plaintext and ciphertext
mapping, and that a form of monoalphabetic substitution was
taking place, it is possible to consider that the plaintext byte
0x00 from the first byte of the plaintext from Figure 11
was mapped to a ciphertext byte of 0x74, per Figure 12.
By observing that the byte 0x74 appears at offset 0x80 of
this 256-byte header, it appears that the plaintext is obtained
by subtracting the value 0x80. This was verified for other
byte values — the ciphertext byte 0x98 corresponded to
plaintext 0x33, and the ciphertext byte appeared at offset
0xb3. Subtracting 0x80 from this resulted in the plaintext
byte 0x33 as expected.
Therefore, it is possible to decode any arbitrary file pro-
tected by this application, simply through cryptanalysis of the
ciphertext, and knowledge of a single plaintext created with
the application. While the header varied between uses of the
program, this process can be used to decode any file created
by the application.
D. Security Conclusions
It has been shown that Encrypt File Free utilises weak ob-
fuscation, which does not require knowledge of a key to access
their so-called “encrypted” files. The cipher is effectively a
monoalphabetic substitution cipher, and offers no protection
from frequency analysis, with the mapping from plaintext to
ciphertext being one-to-one. The process of identifying this
and carrying out the attack was demonstrated, and shown to
be able to be identified merely by analysing ciphertext output
against a single known plaintext.
A written review from a user in September 2015 entitles
“Unbreakable” states “Encryption still holds, after 2 months.
(I hope) LoL” [17]. This does not appear to be the case, and
the ciphertexts were not able to stand up to basic analysis, with
a security level commensurate with that of a monoalphabetic
substitution cipher. The application also leaked the unsalted,
plain MD5 hash of the user’s PIN in the header of each file,
potentially exposing a user’s PIN to other applications, which
may be damaging if this were to be re-used in other scenarios,
such as on a lock-screen or a bank card.
X. DISCUSSION
With all of the encryption apps considered within this work
being relatively user friendly and user-focused, this gives rise
to consideration as to the trade-offs between security and
usability. Many of the applications considered here featured
password reset functionality, allowing users to reset their
encryption password if they forgot it. This naturally raises
questions as to the level of security offered, if it is possible for
the password to be easily reset by the user receiving an email.
There does however raise a more general question, around
whether or not it is ethical or appropriate to advertise software
as being secure, when it is heavily vulnerable to attacks such
as those demonstrated here. Were users to depend on this
software for confidentiality, then suffer as a result of their data
being accessed, despite being encrypted, there is a question
around whether or not such descriptions were misleading or
inaccurate. Given that the applications considered here were
often not implementing any kind of encryption, their claims
are clearly questionable at best.
The United States’ FTC issues advice for app developers,
encouraging them to consider security at the start of making
an application [18], although much of this advice focuses
more on privacy and data protection, rather than on proper
implementation of cryptography. App developers have pre-
viously been found guilty of misleading practices, although
these have typically focused on non-transparent fees to use
applications, such as by sending premium rate SMS messages
without making users aware [19].
It does appear to remain an open question, however, as to
whether or not there is a legal case for claims of false or
misleading advertising against mobile application developers,
especially where an application is made available for free.
While legislation exists to protect consumers from digital
content sales [20], the rise in alternative business models,
whereby the user does not pay directly for the application,
but the developer receives money as a result of advertisments
shown within the application to users, raises questions as
to whether there is any recourse available for users against
misleading claims made by developers.
XI. CONCLUSIONS
An analysis was conducted of a range of Android ap-
plications claiming to implement encryption to protect user
files from unauthorised access. This selection of applications
included highly popular apps, and those by “Top Developers”
on the Google Play Store. Every application here claimed
to encrypt files for privacy or security, but most merely
obfuscated files or removed their headers. Very few used
actual encryption algorithms, despite their claims, and did
those which did use encryption were using it with a static key,
that was the same for every installation of the application. This
was verified by repeating the experiment on a second device
and ensuring “encrypted” files were able to be opened on both
device. In that case, the use of an uninitialised counter-mode
cipher with a static key, it was possible to recover all data
encrypted by the application. Cryptanalysis of a non-standard
algorithm for a monoalphabetic substitution cipher, based upon
a mapping table held in plaintext in the header of the file, was
carried out. This showed that basic analysis could be used to
decode the data, without any requirement to understand the
workings of the application.
These findings are of significant concern, as they show the
security implications for users relying on software such as that
which has been investigated here. Combined, the applications
investigated here have potentially up to 117 million users,
as reported by the rounded (and range-binned) figures within
Google Play. These applications all claimed to use encryption,
and a viable attack has been found to recover plaintext from
each of them. In all cases, it was possible to recover the
plaintext from the ciphertext without knowledge of any key
or other security credential; these techniques serve merely
as obfuscation, and do not offer the properties of properly
implemented encryption, even where ciphers are named or
indeed used, due to serious implementational flaws. Weak-
nesses such as these put sensitive or confidential data at risk
of compromise, due to their false statements of security, and
improper implementations. This highlights the need for open-
source, audited security applications, and shows that users
cannot necessarily trust app ratings, user counts, or developer
claims, when considering security.
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